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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintif!-Respondent,
vs.
MICHAEL DALE GILL,

Case No.
11783

Def endant-A.ppellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a criminal proceeding in which the Defendant,
J!Iichael Dale Gill was charged with the crime of robbery
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 51, Section 1, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, by information filed in the District Court
of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah on December 15, 1967.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The Defendant was tried before a jury, commencing
June :2, 1969, before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux. The
Defendant was found guilty by verdict of the jury, entered
June 3, 1969, of the crime of robbery and sentenced to confinement in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate
term.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Gill seeks a new trial.

,t,nt

.;r\g:e

STATEMENT OF FACTS

cufr

On November 4, 1967, Harman's Take-Home Cafe, 1,
cated in Salt Lake City, Utah, was robbed by two m,,
(Tr. 6-8).
.
Of three employee-:; on duty, only two were called a.i
witnesses by the State (Tr. 5, 22). The State's first \fr
ness, Marilyn Marx identified the Defendant as one of th,
two men involved in the robbery (Tr. 22), but acknowi-.
edged that she had difficulty distinguishing the identifying
characteristics of Defendant when compared with thoS€ 0r
1
the Defendant's brother, James Gill (Tr. 21). A third 11i\ne&3 in behalf of the State, who purported to have accompanied the Defendant at the time of the robbery (Tr. 3132), while describing the incident, used the name "Jim"
when referring to the Defendant (Tr. 31).
There was considerable variance in the testimony of
the State's witnesses as to what the Defendant was purported to have worn at the time of the incident (Tr. 15-16.

38).
For the defense, the Defendant's brother, James Gill
testified thait he and his brother David Gill were the participants in the robbery, and that Michael Gill was not
present at any time (Tr. 43). This testimony was corroborated by the testimony of David Gill (Tr. 52).
Defense counsel attempted to cross-examine the em·
ployee, Marilyn Marx as to her identification of the Defen·

J

,!:int as a p:U'ticipant in the robbery and as

to her knowl-

,:dge of the Defendant's name. Upon objection by the prose-

Ltition, this line of inquiry was cut short:
''Q. When did you first learn the name of the
Defendant, Mike Gill?

"A.

When we were, oh, in the line-up.

"Q. And this is the line-up that the police took
you to for identification purposes?

"A.

Yes.

"Q. Did the police tell you that Mike Gill waog
in that line-up.

"MR. FREDERICK: I will object to the form
of the question - anything the police may have told
her, I think, is not material; be hearsay at this point.
"MR. HANSEN: I will submit it.
"THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
''Q.

Who was present at the line-up?

"A. The - let's see - the three men that
robbed me; the two, the first time; and the two, the
second time; and one did it twice.
"Q.

And what were their names?

"A. The Gill brothers; I don't really know
which one it is, except I know the name is 'Mike
Gill,' becau'Se I have read about it in the paper.
"Q.
what-

You don't know, really, which one it is.

"A. I don't know which one is James or but I know he is Mike Gill.
"Q.

And is this because someone told you so?
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"A.

At the line-up, I think they read off : ,

"Q.

That's right; the police told you so, die:.

"A.

Yes.

names.
they?

"Q. And do you recall the names of the Polit,
that were there?

"A. I know Elton was there; he is the one tlw
come down to inv&Stigate that night, that I 118 ,
robbed.
"Q.

You know any others that were at tht

"A.

No.

line-up?

''Q. And, in this line-up there weren't any
Mexicans, were there?

"MR. FREDERICK: Your Honor, I am
to object how the line-up - No. 1, has gone bey0M
the scope of direct examination; it isn't relevant ti
this matter.
"THE COURT: Objection is sustained; beyonc!
the scope.
"Q. In this line-up, there were no negroes,
were there?

"MR. FREDERICK: Make the same objection.
your Honor.
"THE COURT: Objection sustained.
"Q.

In this line-up, there were no more than

"THE COURT: Now, listen; objection to this
type of qu&Stion is isustained, and don't ask any
,
like that.
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":\IR
its. your Honor?

\Vould you identify my lim-

"THE COURT: Yes; you understand the limits, very well.
"MR. HANSEN : I am asking for instruction
from the Court; I do not - I think I am entitled
to go into this.
"THE COURT: The Court instructs you, it is
beyond the scope of the direct testimony; and the
objection is sustained; and don't go into it, any
more.
"MR. HANSEN: Does this mean the entire
circumstances surrounding the line-up?
"THE COURT: Entire circumstances surrounding the line-up; you may call the witness as
your own witness, if you choose; this is beyond the
scope of the direct testimony" (Tr. 12-14).
ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT DEFENSE COUNSEL TO CROSS-EXAMTHE STATE'S WITNESS ON THE BASIS
FOR HER IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT.
Identification is almost always a matter of opinion.
Stafr' v. CJwnibers, 104 Ariz. 247, 451 P. 2d 27 (1969);
State v. Sutton, 272 Minn. 399, 138 N. W. 2d 46 (1965);
State v. Linzia, 412 S. W. 2d 116 (Mo. 1967).
Thus, when a witness testifies that an in6dent occmTed, and that a given person was involved in the incictent, the witness is in reality saying that the fact of the

incident occ:urred and that, based upon what the

·

WI tile<:

was able to and did observe, it is the opinion of the ,,itnt1.
that the person identified is the same pePSon involved ,
the incident. Such opinions, ru:; all testimonial opinio"s a,e'.
open to the test of cross-examination not only as to n.
competency of the witness to form the opinion - as tr,
what the witness saw and was able to see, but also as to th,
validity and credibility of the facts forming the basis n;
the opinion - as to whether the purported facts upon which
the opinion is based in reality occurred. State v. Peek, 1 ·
U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953); State v. Ward, 10 U. 2d
34, 347 P. 2d 865 (1959).
l!

'

When the question of identity is directly in issue, as
it was here, the widest breadth of cross-examination should 1
be permitted to test not only the weight and credibility of
the identification but, as importantly, to test the competency of the witness to arrive at that identification. This '
is particularly so, as a matter of basic and fundamental
justice, when the question directly in issue is one of identit)·
of the accused. The cornerstone nature of the right to so
cross-examine is reflected in the constitutionally secured
prerogaitive to appear and defend and be confronted by the
witness testifying against an accused (Constitution of Utah
Article I section 12), for as this Court, itself, has said, the
right of croos-examinartion is inherent in the right of confrontation of and by witnesses. State v. Mannion, 19 Utah
505, 57 Pac. 542 (1899). See also People v. Hume, 56 C. A.
2d 262, 132 P. 2d 52 (1943); Archina v. Proplc, 135 Colo.
8, 307 P. 2d 1083 (1957); State v . .Merritt, 66 Nev. 380,
212 P. 2d 706 (1949).
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.\t the trial helow, there can be no doubt but that the

of this Defendant as one of the participants in the
,>1. 1wry

was squarely at issue. The Defendant's brothers
Ii·" :c<i ,·ip;] thclt tl:ey and not the Defendant were the
parties to the crime. The State's own witness acknowledged
the difficulty in distinguishing between the Defendant and
>ndte1· J:n:1es, and the purported accomplice, Linda
Ft"lnnal. with a significant siip of the tongue, indicated
t:::'. it: .,1·as James Gill anct not the Defendant who was the
c1i-j1erpctrntor. A major portion of Marilyn :Marx's testim .,: ,. :n: clii·e;_ t examination was devoted to identifying the
Defl·ntlan.t (Tr. 8-11).
1

::

1

of the subject line of questioning then goes to
the fundamental inquiry to be made of every identification
Ti10

Whether the witness was able to identify the suspect
of her own knowledge and based upon her own observation;
or ,,·hether, in fact, the witness's identification of the defendant \ms predicated upon what the police or others had
t 1>ld her. the nature of the line-up and the manner in which
it was conducted, or other information which the identifying ''ritness obtained second-hand \\·hich tainted her identification by suggestive implication and innuendo and which
forced her to a testimonial conclusion at which she would
not otherwise have been able to arrive.
\Vith the trial in this posture, the Court should have
pennitted defense counsel the greatest leeway in cross-examining l\forib·n Marx on her identification of the Defendant.

8

Information r;ainrd at th(' linr-up may well hai·r
the sole p1wlicatc upon ll'hich thP witness based hc1· idnit ..
fication.
But instead, the Court cut short this highly german,
and relevant inquiry on the ground that such examinatir)n
was beyond the scope of direct examination (Tr. 14).
We submit that such circumscription of defense coun.
.sel's right to cross-examine on a matter directly in i'Ssue
was irreparably prejudicial to this Defendant, and effectively suspended his right to meaningfully confront the
primary and chief witness against him and to test the com.
petency and credibiliity of her opinion.

1

The principles enunciated in State v. Peek, supra, a
case dealing with cross-examination of expert witnes-ses to
test therir opinions, are equally applicable to the present
case. This Court stated:
"There is no other instrument so well <Jdapted
to discovery of the truth as c1·oss-examination, and
as long as it tends to disclose the truth it sh0uld
never be curtailed or limited. Any inquiry should
be allowed which an individual about to buy \\·ould
feel it in his interest to make."
The Court went on to hold that:
"Cross-examination of an opinion witness may
embrace an investigation of the qualifications of the
witness rhis competency to arrive at an opinion!·
the extent of his knowledge, reasons for his opinion.
and the factors upon which his opinion is based.''
See alw Stc•te v. Ward, Sll]Jrn. In a<lrlressing itself to the
scope of cross-examination, the Comt, in Peek, held that:

9
''A witness may be asked on cross-examination
any facts which would be admiso:;ible on direct examination * * *." (Emphasis added.)

Ewn it' it were a·ssumed that the matter of identification ,1·as beyond the scope of direct examination, in which
t'\'t<llt the State would not have m'.lde its case, it is indisput,1,,Je that the right of cross-examination extends beyond the
limits of direct examination when testing the credibility of
"·itness as to his opinion or when attempting to impeach
the testimony of the witness. And defense counsel's attack
here was predicated upon both testing witness's competency

to make such an identification and impeachment of her
credibility.
Inasmuch as the testimony of a witness is not stronger
than where it is left on cross-examination, Oberg v. Sand1•1...:,

111 Utah 507, 184 P. 2d 229 (1947); and since the jury

rnulrl neve1· know what the ·witness would have testified if
defense counsel had been permitted to pursue his crossexamination; and when the effect of the absence of such
testimony on the jury verdict cannot be measured or
wt>ig-hed, this Court, as it has done in the past should find
prejudicial error and grant Defendant a new trial. State
v. Po('. 21 U. 2d 113, 441 P. 2d 512 (1968).
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial Court erred

prejudicially in refusing to permit defense counsel to fully

10

cross-examine the State's witness to test her identification
of the Defendant.
Accordingly, it iis urged that this Court grant a new
trial.
RespectfuHy submitted,

JOHN D. O'CONNELL
STEWART M. HANSON, JR.
Attorneys for Appellant

